CMP470 Urgency Request Letter
Summary
CMP470 proposes a commitment fee for technologies oversubscribed relative to Clean Power 2030 targets, aimed at forcing speculative projects out of the connection queue. The CUSC Panel voted by majority to recommend urgent treatment to Ofgem, with a final modification report targeted for 30 June 2026 under the urgent timeline versus April 2027 under standard process. The proposal was raised by Field Energy on 20 March 2026 after Gate 2 capacity data revealed approximately 90 GW of battery storage projects seeking connection points when roughly one third will actually connect.
Why it matters
This is the right mechanism: pricing queue capacity rather than administering it. Speculative BESS projects holding free options on grid capacity are forcing TOs to design substations for 90 GW of storage that will never be built — a direct cost imposed on every other developer and ultimately on consumers. The dissenting panel members who argue this could have been raised earlier are correct on timing but wrong on materiality.
Key facts
- •CMP470 raised by Field Energy on 20 March 2026
- •CUSC Panel voted majority in favour of urgency on 27 March 2026
- •Gate 2 capacity data (January 2026) revealed ~90 GW of BESS seeking connection
- •NESO estimates only ~one third of Gate 2 BESS will actually connect
- •TOs currently designing new substations to accommodate full 90 GW despite known oversubscription
- •Urgent timeline targets final modification report to Ofgem by 30 June 2026
- •Standard timeline would deliver final report by April 2027
- •Ofgem urgency decision required by 5pm on 2 April 2026
- •Builds on precedent of CMP448 urgency (accepted by Ofgem)
Timeline
Areas affected
Related programmes
Memo
What changed
The CUSC Panel voted by majority on 27 March 2026 to recommend that Ofgem grant urgent treatment to CMP470, a modification that would introduce a commitment fee for technologies oversubscribed relative to Clean Power 2030 capacity targets. The modification was raised by Field Energy on 20 March 2026 after Gate 2 capacity data, released in January 2026, revealed approximately 90 GW of battery storage projects seeking grid connections — roughly three times what will actually connect. The Panel's letter to Ofgem requests an urgency decision by 2 April 2026, with a final modification report targeted for 30 June 2026. Under the standard timeline, that report would not reach Ofgem until April 2027.
The proposal targets a specific failure: queue positions are free options on grid capacity, and rational developers hoard them. With no cost to holding a place, speculative BESS projects have no incentive to withdraw. The commitment fee would impose a floor on securities, converting a free option into a priced one. Projects that intend to build will pay it. Projects that do not will leave.
What this means in practice
For battery storage developers: This is the immediate target. The 90 GW figure is the headline, but the mechanism matters more than the number. Every BESS project that passed Gate 2 would face a commitment fee calibrated to the degree of oversubscription in its technology class. The fee is not a penalty for existing — it is a price for holding scarce capacity. Developers with financeable projects and genuine site control will absorb it. Developers holding speculative positions with no route to construction will not. That is the point.
For all other developers: The connection queue is not just slow — it is designing infrastructure for a world that will not exist. NESO and the Transmission Owners are currently allocating specific substation bays to all Gate 2 projects, including the two-thirds of BESS projects that will never build. TOs are being forced to design large new substations to accommodate storage volumes that are neither needed nor economically viable. Every connection offer issued this summer will be based on a network design that, as the letter states, "most stakeholders accept bears little resemblance to that which is actually needed." Non-BESS developers — wind, solar, demand connections, gas peakers — are paying for this through delayed offers and inflated connection charges that reflect phantom infrastructure.
For consumers: The cost transmission is indirect but real. TO overinvestment in unnecessary substation capacity feeds through to TNUoS charges. Delayed connections for viable generation and demand projects mean later energisation dates, higher constraint costs, and a slower path to the capacity the system actually needs. The Panel member who argued this is merely about "bringing forward connection dates" and "increasing monetary returns to the project owner" missed the point: the cost of the current queue is not borne by the speculative projects sitting in it, but by everyone else.
The dissent is worth noting for what it reveals. Two Panel members voted against urgency. Their argument: oversubscription has been visible since April 2025 via the Regens dashboard, the TO/NESO process for developing connections has not changed, and therefore this could have been raised earlier. They are right on timing — this was foreseeable. But their conclusion that it therefore fails the urgency test confuses the question of whether someone should have acted sooner with whether the problem is now urgent. Connection offers based on a 90 GW phantom network are being issued this summer. The window to prevent TOs from locking in overinvestment through signed connection agreements is months, not years.
What happens next
By 2 April 2026: Ofgem decides whether to grant urgency. Given that Ofgem accepted the urgency case for CMP448 (the predecessor modification addressing similar queue issues), and the Panel's letter explicitly argues the case is stronger now, approval is likely.
April–June 2026 (if urgent): Eight workgroup sessions across April and May, a compressed workgroup consultation (24–30 April), Code Administrator consultation in early June, and a final modification report to Ofgem by 30 June 2026. The entire process from Panel to Ofgem decision in three months. Both consultation windows are shorter than the standard 15 business days — a trade-off the Panel accepted given the timeline pressure.
If standard process: Workgroups would run May 2026 to January 2027, with the final report reaching Ofgem in April 2027. By then, Gate 2 offers will have been issued, connection agreements signed, and TO investment committed. The standard timeline does not just delay the fix — it eliminates it. The infrastructure gets built for 90 GW regardless.
The NESO Panel member flagged the critical risk: achievability depends on the solution the Workgroup develops. The principle — price the queue — is sound. The implementation — fee level, technology classification, interaction with existing securities, treatment of projects that have already signed agreements — is where this could stall or be diluted. CMP448's experience will be instructive. Watch the workgroup outputs in May for whether the fee is set high enough to actually clear speculative capacity, or whether it becomes another modest administrative cost that incumbents absorb and new entrants resent.
Related: This sits alongside the broader Connections Reform programme and Gate 2 offer issuance. If CMP470 succeeds, the next gated application window would face a materially shorter queue. If it fails or is delayed, the 90 GW problem persists until projects are terminated for missing development milestones — a process the proposer estimates would take "several years."
Source text
Public Nadir Hafeez Ofgem By email Anthony Pygram Independent Chair CUSC & Grid Code Panel 27 March 2026 CMP470 Request for Urgency Dear Nadir Connection and Use of System Code (CUSC) Modification Panel Request for Urgency and Recommended Timetable for CMP470: Introducing an Oversubscribed Technologies Commitment Fee. On 20 March 2026, Field Energy raised CMP470. The Proposer sent a request to the CUSC Panel Secretary for this modification to be treated as urgent. CMP470 seeks to Introduce a floor on securities through an Oversubscribed Technologies Commitment Fee for all technologies which are oversubscribed relative to Clean Power 2030 capacity targets. All documentation for this modification can be located via the following link. The CUSC Modifications Panel ("the Panel") on 27 March 2026, considered CMP470 and the associated request for urgency. This letter sets out the views of the Panel on the request for urgent treatment and the procedure and timetable that the Panel recommends. The Proposer set out their rationale for Urgency against Ofgem’s Urgency criteria (a) which is as follows: a) A significant commercial impact on parties, consumers or other stakeholder(s). If not quickly addressed, the issue of oversubscription will have a significant commercial impact on all developers of oversubscribed technologies, developers of other technologies, and in turn on end consumers. • Developers of oversubscribed technologies: with no incentive for the least economic projects to leave the queue, the best projects are held up. • Developers of other technologies are being repeatedly impacted by delays to issuing connection offers. The most recent of these was published in February 2026, driven in part by “Updated background assumptions … in some locations where the volume of projects at Gate 2 are higher than forecast. • End consumers will ultimately be impacted by the delay to good projects being able to progress. This has only recently come to light as an imminent issue due to two updates: Public • The release of Gate 2 capacity data in January 2026 which revealed the extent of the oversubscription. • The way NESO and TOs are handling Construction Planning Assumptions and network design. We now understand that NESO and TOs are seeking to allocate specific connection points to all Gate 2 projects, despite a strong likelihood that only ~one third of Gate 2 Battery Energy Storage System (BESS) will connect In practice, these two factors combined means allocating substation bays to ~90GW of storage projects, even though that much is neither needed nor economically viable in the market. TOs are therefore being forced to design large new substations to accommodate large volumes of BESS which will never be built. Gate 2 Offers being issued over the coming months will be based on a network design which most stakeholders accept bears little resemblance to that which is actually needed. In order to avoid multiple repeats of this process, the queue must be reduced ahead of offers being issued after the next Gated Application Window. Without this change (or an alternative solution), this problem will persist until projects are terminated for failing to meet development milestones – a process which will take several years. Panel Consideration of the Request for Urgency The Panel considered the request for urgency with reference to Ofgem Guidance on Code Modification Urgency Criteria. The majority view of the Panel is that CMP470 does meet Ofgem’s Urgency criteria1. Therefore, the recommendation of the Panel is that CMP470 should be treated as an Urgent CUSC Modification Proposal. Panel members set out their rationale behind this decision: • A Panel member agreed with the Proposer rationale that this modification seeks to create the right incentive for Users to proceed with projects that are oversubscribed. • The NESO Panel member noted they were supportive of both the proposal and the case for urgency - for similar reasons to their thinking on CMP448. The NESO Panel member was supportive of a modification that seeks to improve significantly over-subscribed parts of the queue, as that will aid overall queue health, which will have a significant positive commercial impact on parties that remain in the queue. NESO does note that, as highlighted during CUSC Panel, the achievability of the modification - a factor which has previously led to other urgency requests being rejected - will depend on the solution which Workgroup develops. • A Panel member agreed with the Proposer’s justification for recommending urgency and also concurred with the NESO position, as set out at the Panel meeting, in respect of the 1 Ofgem’s current view is that an urgent modification should be linked to an imminent issue or a current issue that if not urgently addressed may cause: a) A significant commercial impact on parties, consumers or other stakeholder(s); or b) A significant impact on the safety and security of the electricity and/or gas systems; or c) A party to be in breach of any relevant legal requirements. Public CMP448 urgency justification (which was accepted by Ofgem) as in the reasoning then (for that Modification) is even more so now (with this Modification). • A Panel member stated that the connection queue reform process has not worked in producing a queue that is in line with the Strategic Plan. As such, the TOs appear to be constructing to deliver the over-subscribed queue. That is clearly inefficient. This inefficiency will be locked in if developers proceed to sign connection agreements that commit TOs to over-invest. Agreements are being issued now and during the Summer. As such, the problem is now and as such is urgent and could not have been predicted. Finally, if urgency was appropriate for CMP448, it is even more appropriate for CMP470. • A view of a Panel member was that this modification does not meet the urgency criteria as the defect does not have a significant commercial impact on stakeholders. The defect identified does not change the costs associated with delivering or operating generation connected to or connecting to the electricity network. The defect suggests that projects are being issued with a later connection date than they would otherwise expect if the oversubscribed projects were not part of the connections queue. Bringing forward connection dates increases the value of the project rights associated with a proposed development and therefore increases the monetary returns to the project owner. Although this is a commercial impact, they do not think it is significant enough to require an urgency for CMP470. • The same Panel member further explained that there has been clear evidence of oversubscribed batteries since April 2025. Regens dashboard highlighted the oversubscription. The process Transmission Owners (TOs) and NESO use to develop new connections has been well known and has not changed in the last 12 months, therefore this modification could have been raised earlier to ensure it was in place for when Gate 2 offers were issued. There is no commercial impact on customers if this modification is implemented after Gate 2 offers are issued. Projects will be able to make an investment decision to keep the connection as and when the commitment fee is issued. • A view from another Panel member was that this modification did not meet the urgency criteria as in their view, this has been a long-known issue, and the materiality is not necessarily higher than other code changes. Any net benefit to the consumer is not entirely clear. Procedure and Timetable The Panel discussed an appropriate timetable for CMP470 in the instance that urgency is granted. The Panel agreed that CMP470 subject to Ofgem’s decision on Urgency should follow the attached Code Administrator’s proposed timetable (Appendix 1 Urgent recommendation). In Appendix 2 of this letter, the Code Administrator has also provided the timeline if this follows standard timescales with the assumption that Panel prioritises this high in the prioritisation stack. Panel noted that if urgency is required, there would be; Public o A Workgroup Consultation period of less than 15 Business Days o Code Administrator Consultation period of less than 15 Business Days o There would be less than 5 clear Business Days between publication of the Draft Final Modification Report and Panel’s recommendation; and o There would be less than 5 clear Business Days for Panel to check that their Recommendation Vote had been recorded correctly Under CUSC Section 8.24.4, we are now consulting the Authority as to whether this Modification is an Urgent CUSC Modification Proposal. Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any questions on this letter or the proposed process and timetable. I look forward to receiving your response Yours sincerely Anthony Pygram Anthony Pygram Independent Chair of the CUSC and Grid Code Panel Appendix 1– Urgent Timeline Modification Stage Date Modification presented to Panel 27 March 2026 Workgroup Nominations 30 March – 02 April 2026 Ofgem decision on Urgency By 5pm on 02 April 2026 Workgroups 1- 4 09 April 2026 14 April 2026 16 April 2026 21 April 2026 Workgroup Consultation 24 April 2026 – 30 April Workgroups 5-8 06 May 2026 12 May 2026 14 May 2026 19 May 2026 Workgroup Report issued to Panel 28 May 2026 Panel sign off that Workgroup Report has met its Terms of Reference 05 June (Special Panel) Code Administrator Consultation 08 June 2026 – 15 June 2026 Draft Final Modification Report (DFMR) issued to Panel 18 June 2026 Public Panel undertake DFMR recommendation vote 26 June 2026 Final Modification Report issued to Panel to check votes recorded correctly 26 - 29 June 2026 Final Modification Report issued to Ofgem 30 June 2026 Ofgem decision TBC Implementation Date TBC Appendix 2 – Standard Timeline Modification Stage Date Modification presented to Panel 27 March 2026 Workgroup Nominations 30 March – 22 April 2026 (2 bank holidays) Workgroups 1- 5 05 May 2026 28 May 2026 23 June 2026 21 July 2026 13 August 2026 Workgroup Consultation 20 August 2026 – 16 September 2026 Workgroups 6-9 01 October 2026 29 October 2026 24 November 2026 7 January 2027 Workgroup Report issued to Panel 21 January 2027 Panel sign off that Workgroup Report has met its Terms of Reference 29 January 2027 Code Administrator Consultation 8 February 2027 – 01 March 2027 Draft Final Modification Report (DFMR) issued to Panel 18 March 2027 Panel undertake DFMR recommendation vote 26 March 2027 Final Modification Report issued to Panel to check votes recorded correctly 31 March – 07 April 2027 Final Modification Report issued to Ofgem 12 April 2027 Ofgem decision TBC Implementation Date TBC See separate attachment Appendix 3 – Panel Urgency Vote