Nuclear Third Party Liability for Advanced Nuclear Technologies: call for evidence
This consultation is open for responses
Respond to this consultationSummary
DESNZ seeks evidence on whether nuclear third-party liability treaties designed for large reactors should apply unchanged to SMRs and AMRs, or require alternative arrangements. The consultation explores liability frameworks under the Paris/Brussels Conventions and CSC for advanced nuclear technologies. No specific changes are proposed — this is evidence-gathering to inform future policy.
Why it matters
The current liability framework assumes large-scale accidents with correspondingly large compensation pools, potentially over-insuring smaller reactors while under-pricing systemic risks from multiple distributed units. As such, this could either reduce regulatory burden for SMR/AMR developers or reveal that distributed nuclear requires different risk allocation mechanisms.
Key facts
- •UK party to Paris/Brussels Conventions and Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage
- •Current treaties designed for traditional large-scale nuclear technologies
- •Consultation targets SMR and AMR liability arrangements
Areas affected
Related programmes
Memo
What this is about
DESNZ is questioning whether nuclear third-party liability treaties designed for large reactors should apply unchanged to SMRs and AMRs. The current framework—the Paris/Brussels Conventions and Convention on Supplementary Compensation (CSC)—assumes traditional gigawatt-scale plants with correspondingly large potential accident impacts and compensation pools.
This evidence-gathering exercise reflects growing recognition that advanced nuclear technologies present different risk profiles. A 300MW SMR may not justify the same liability structure as a 3GW plant, but multiple distributed units could create systemic risks not captured by current operator-by-operator frameworks. The consultation seeks industry input on whether existing treaties adequately address these technologies or whether alternative arrangements are needed.
Options on the table
The consultation does not propose specific options but explores two broad approaches:
Maintain current framework
SMRs and AMRs would operate under existing Paris/Brussels Conventions and CSC structures, with the same liability requirements, compensation mechanisms, and operator responsibilities as conventional large reactors. Nuclear operators would pay insurance premiums scaled to current risk assessment methodologies, potentially over-insuring smaller units while benefiting from established legal frameworks and international coordination mechanisms. This approach provides regulatory certainty but may impose disproportionate costs on smaller reactor developers.
Alternative arrangements
New liability frameworks tailored to advanced nuclear technologies' specific characteristics. This could involve different compensation levels, modified risk allocation between operators and states, or novel approaches to address multiple small reactors operated by single entities. Developers of smaller reactors could face lower liability costs, but would trade regulatory clarity for uncertainty about future frameworks. The approach might better reflect actual risk profiles but could fragment international nuclear liability coordination.
Questions being asked
The consultation does not include formal numbered questions but seeks evidence across several themes:
Applicability of current treaties
Whether Paris/Brussels Conventions and CSC adequately address SMRs and AMRs, given these treaties were designed for large-scale traditional nuclear plants. The department wants evidence on whether current liability levels, compensation mechanisms, and operator responsibilities match the risk profiles of smaller modular reactors.
Technology-specific considerations
How SMRs and AMRs differ from conventional reactors in ways that affect liability frameworks. This includes evidence on accident scenarios, potential damage scales, operator structures, and whether multiple small reactors present different collective risks than single large plants.
Alternative framework design
What alternative liability arrangements might better suit advanced nuclear technologies. The consultation seeks input on different approaches to risk allocation, compensation levels, international coordination, and regulatory structures that could replace or supplement existing treaties.
Economic and commercial impacts
How current liability requirements affect SMR and AMR development, deployment, and operation. This includes evidence on insurance costs, developer financing, and whether existing frameworks create barriers to advanced nuclear technologies or distort investment decisions.
International coordination
Whether alternative arrangements would affect UK participation in international nuclear liability frameworks and coordination with other jurisdictions developing advanced nuclear technologies. The consultation examines whether changes might fragment global approaches to nuclear third-party liability.
How to respond
The consultation document and response submission details are available on GOV.UK. Respondents should provide evidence supporting their positions, particularly quantitative analysis of liability costs, risk assessments, and commercial impacts. The department seeks input from nuclear operators, technology developers, insurers, legal practitioners, and other stakeholders across the nuclear supply chain.
Source text
Nuclear Third Party Liability (NTPL) treaties are international agreements which ensure that in the unlikely event of a nuclear incident there is a minimum amount of compensation available to victims and that claims are channelled appropriately to the operator of a nuclear installation and the jurisdiction in which an incident occurred. The UK is party to the Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy (the Paris Convention) and the Brussels Convention Supplementary to the Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy (the Brussels Convention), together known as the Paris/Brussels Conventions, and the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC). These treaties were initially established on the basis of traditional large-scale nuclear technologies, and this Call for Evidence seeks to gather evidence to support policy consideration on whether the default approach under the current system is the most appropriate for Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) and Advanced Modular Reactors (AMRs) or whether an alternative arrangement should be explored. Read the [Call for Evidence document on GOV.UK](https://www.gov.uk/government/calls-for-evidence/nuclear-third-party-liability-for-advanced-nuclear-technologies).