Treasury Minutes – April 2026

Presented to Parliament by Command of His Majesty. Treasury Minutes Government Response to the Committee of Public Accounts on the Sixty-second to the Sixty-seventh reports from Session 2024-26 CP 1522 April 2026 HM Treasury Treasury Minutes Government Response to the Committee of Public Accounts on the Sixty-second to the Sixty-seventh reports from Session 2024-26 Presented to Parliament by the Exchequer Secretary to the Treasury by Command of His Majesty April 2026 CP 1522 © Crown copyright 2026 This publication is licenced under the term of the Open Government Licence v.3.0 except where otherwise stated. To view this licence, visit nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government-licence/version/3. Where we have identified any third party copyright information, you will need to obtain permission from the copyright holders concerned. This publication is available at www.gov.uk/official-documents. 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Printed in the UK by HH Associates Ltd. on behalf of the Controller of His Majesty’s Stationery Office. 1 Government response to the Committee of Public Accounts Session 2024-26 Report Title Page Sixty-second report: Faulty energy efficiency installations 2 Department for Energy Security and Net Zero Sixty-third report: Increasing police productivity 12 Home Office Sixty-fourth report: Cost of clinical negligence 19 Department of Health and Social Care Sixty-fifth report: Efficiency and resilience of the Probation Service 28 Ministry of Justice Sixty-sixth report: Tackling fraud and error in benefit expenditure 2024-25 34 Department for Work and Pensions Sixty-seventh report: NS&I’s transformation programme 40 HM Treasury 2 Sixty-second Report of Session 2024-26 Department for Energy Security and Net Zero Faulty energy efficiency installations Introduction from the Committee The Energy Company Obligation (ECO) is a government scheme intended to tackle fuel poverty and reduce carbon emissions in Great Britain. ECO is funded from consumer bills rather than the Exchequer. Medium and large energy suppliers are obligated to achieve a minimum level of energy bill savings in homes through the installation of energy efficiency measures. The scheme is aimed at low-income households in homes with poor energy efficiency ratings. There are currently two ECO schemes: ECO4 runs from April 2022 to March 2026 and the Great British Insulation Scheme (GBIS), which has broader eligibility, runs from March 2023 to March 2026. ECO4 focuses on multi-measure retrofits, in contrast with the single-measure retrofits offered under previous ECO schemes and GBIS. The Department expects each beneficiary household to save up to £450 on their annual energy bills under ECO4 and up to £230 on GBIS. To March 2025, 304,500 homes had been upgraded through the schemes, worth £4.2 billion, including 28,000 installations of external wall insulation and 45,200 installations of internal wall insulation. Since we took evidence in November 2025, the government announced it would end ECO, with no levies on consumer bills from April 2026, but that it would continue to invest in tackling fuel poverty through its Warm Homes Plan. However, the Department explained in written evidence submitted after our session that it had not yet formally confirmed whether it would extend the period for suppliers to meet their existing ECO4 obligations beyond March 2026. The Department is responsible for the design of ECO and the wider quality assurance and consumer protection system. It introduced a new system in 2021, which included a single quality mark for retrofits and higher standards that consider multi-measure retrofits in the context of the whole home, both of which would be overseen by TrustMark, a not-for-profit company. Many other organisations are involved. Ofgem is responsible for ECO’s administration. The United Kingdom Accreditation Service (also a not-for-profit company) accredits the ‘certification bodies’ that certify that installers meet the required installation quality standards. A range of other private businesses are also involved in delivering the scheme. In October 2024, TrustMark notified the Department of high levels of external wall insulation installations that were not compliant with quality standards. TrustMark highlighted similar issues with internal wall insulation early the following month. Non-compliance covers a wide range of severity, from major issues that pose immediate risks to the health and safety of the household or that will affect the insulations performance, and often lead to damp and mould, to minor issues such as missing paperwork. Since then, the Department, Ofgem, TrustMark and UKAS have taken action to understand the root causes of the problems, find-and-fix the affected homes, and limit any further faulty installations. Based on a report by the National Audit Office, the Committee took evidence on 13 November 2025 from the Department of Energy Security and Net Zero. The Committee published its report on 23 January 2026. This is the government’s response to the Committee’s report. Relevant reports • NAO report: Energy efficiency installations under the Energy Company Obligation – Session 2024-26 (HC 1334) 3 • PAC report: Faulty energy efficiency installations – Session 2024-25 (HC 1229) Government response to the Committee 1. PAC conclusion: A clear and catastrophic failure with external and internal wall insulation installations under ECO4 and GBIS has left more than 30,000 homes with defects. 1. PAC recommendation: The Department should not allow any more external or internal wall insulation to be installed through its retrofit schemes unless it can ensure that every new project will be supervised and checked by someone who is independent, competent and accountable. 1.1 The government disagrees with the Committee’s recommendation. 1.2 The extent and scale of non-compliant external and internal wall insulation under the ECO4 scheme was unacceptable and must never be repeated. The department has greater confidence in the quality of installation and compliance in local authority delivered retrofit programmes and therefore disagree with the recommendation insofar as it relates to schemes other than ECO4 and GBIS. 1.3 Every household with external wall insulation (EWI) installed under ECO4 and GBIS is being and will be offered an on-site audit. Subject to the householder accepting the offer, all EWI installed under ECO4 and GBIS will be checked by an independent, trained and accountable auditor. 1.4 All households that received internal wall insulation (IWI) under ECO4 and GBIS are being written to and can raise concerns and request an audit via the Ofgem contact centre, which will be subject to triage. Where cases meet the threshold of risk factors, households are referred for an on-site audit by an independent, trained and accountable auditor. This includes all ongoing installations. This approach manages priorities and audit capacity in a practical way, taking account of the measured rates of non-compliance. 1.5 All EWI and IWI measures installed under ECO4 and GBIS schemes should have a guarantee that lasts for 25 years, meaning should issues be found in the future, the protections within the guarantee can be invoked within this timeframe. 1.6 The non-compliance rates found under ECO4 and GBIS for EWI and IWI are not replicated in government-funded capital schemes. In October 2025, the department published audit results for the Social Housing Decarbonisation Fund (SHDF) Wave 2 and the Home Upgrade Grant Phase 2 (HUG 2) showing a 0.7% category 1 and 9% major non-compliance rate for all measures and 0% category 1 and 11.7% major non-compliance for solid wall insulation. The system in place for these schemes is much more effective in managing compliance due to the additional controls from Local Authorities and Housing Associations, including mandatory audits from Grant Recipients, as well as separate independent audits by the delivery partner PWC. There is no evidence to require an onsite audit for all solid wall insulation installations under government-funded capital schemes. Where there are non- compliances, the Grant Recipients are responsible for resolving these issues through working with their supply chain as well as supporting residents through the IBG process if necessary. The department is confident that when non-compliance is identified it is swiftly resolved without intervention from the department due to existing checks and the department monitors this process directly when non-compliances are identified through our delivery partners. 1.7 In addition to the ongoing programme of onsite audits, the department continues to implement improvements to the current system of compliance, assurance and wider consumer protections. Improvements include: 4 • Updated standards to both require a higher level of qualification for retrofit designers and to require site visits from retrofit co-ordinators for all high-risk measures. This includes installations of EWI and IWI, giving an additional layer of on-site assurance. • TrustMark and certification bodies using suspension as a penalty and therefore a deterrent. • Enhanced checks and increased oversight of contractors by energy suppliers; • Greater oversight by the department of TrustMark’s operations; • Frequent and regular focussed engagement between the department and all parties in the system of oversight and compliance; • New restrictions preventing installers from evading accountability by operating through multiple certification bodies; • Changes to the ECO4 legislation that gave Ofgem the ability to reject measures, installed after the date of the changes, found to be non-compliant with PAS2030/2035; and • Measures found to be non-compliant can be rejected by Ofgem, if the lodgement has first been voided by TrustMark within the data warehouse. 2. PAC conclusion: Nearly one year after the problems emerged, around 3,000 homes with defects had been found and fixed out of the more than 30,000 homes estimate to be affected. 2a. PAC recommendation: In its Treasury Minute response the department should set out: • how it plans to scale-up its find-and-fix programme to meet the 15-month ambition; and … 2.1 The government agrees with the Committee’s recommendation. Recommendation implemented 2.2 Having completed a mobilisation phase, including recruitment of auditing capacity, TrustMark reached full operational delivery of the find-and-fix programme in late January 2026 and currently intend for the programme to complete by May 2027 in line with ECO4 closure timeframes. The department has seen a steady increase in the number of audits undertaken and the level of remediation being delivered. The department, TrustMark, Ofgem, certification bodies, guarantee providers and retrofit businesses are working to accelerate the rate of fixing non-compliances. 2b. PAC recommendation: In its Treasury Minute response the department should set out: • …how it will find all the faulty internal wall insulation. 2.3 The government agrees with the Committee’s recommendation. Target Implementation date: Spring 2027 2.4 To supplement the PAS2030 and PAS2035 required audit regime, all households with IWI installed during the ECO4 scheme (that is, April 2022 to the end of December 2026) will receive a letter. These letters advise households to raise any concerns with their IWI with the Ofgem contact centre. The department is working with behavioural experts to review communication with households to ensure that messages are understood and appropriate support is provided. 2.5 All concerns raised are triaged, and where they meet the threshold of risk factors, households are referred for an independent audit. IWI measures installed under ECO4 and 5 GBIS schemes should have a guarantee that lasts for 25 years, meaning that, should issues be found in the future, the protections within the guarantee can be invoked within this timeframe. This approach manages priorities and audit capacity in a practical way, taking account of the measured rates of non-compliance. The department will keep this approach under review in light of future evidence. 2.6 No householder should have poor quality work in their home. Officials are continually pushing the responsible parties in the system to remediate all non-compliances that are identified. The department tracks progress and officials have frequent and regular meetings with TrustMark, certification bodies, United Kingdom Accreditation Service (UKAS) and energy suppliers. 2c. PAC recommendation: Given the severity of the issue for residents of affected homes, the Department should be seeking to deliver the find-and-fix programme within a much shorter timeframe and should update the Committee in writing every six months on progress with the programme and the rate of remediation of all external and internal faults in its Treasury Minutes. 2.7 The government agrees with the Committee’s recommendation. Target implementation date: June 2026 2.8 The department will update the Committee in writing every six months on progress, with the first update, by letter, due in June 2026. Subsequent updates will be provided via the regular Treasury Minute cycle. 2.9 The timetable for the find-and-fix programme was developed based on assumptions about the rate of success in contacting households to book an audit balanced against the speed at which auditors can be deployed. Under the find-and-fix programme, TrustMark is required to make three attempts at contact using at least two methods. In addition, the department is supporting area-based engagement, which has been piloted in Luton, to facilitate increased uptake of audit offers. 2.10 Delivery is constrained by consumer uptake of audits, the limited availability of specialist auditors, and the geographical spread of consumers. The department has already supported TrustMark to increase auditor capacity for the find-and-fix programme and will continue to explore every avenue to increase capacity. 2.11 It is unlikely that the department will be able to deliver the find-and-fix programme on a significantly shorter timescale; however, officials are closely overseeing progress and will seek opportunities to reduce the timeframe wherever this is possible. 3. PAC conclusion: Households do not have real assurance the government will protect them from unaffordable bills when the original installer or guarantees do not cover the cost of repairs. 3. PAC recommendation: Given the urgency of this matter, the Department should write to the Committee within two weeks of this report: • with a credible plan for how it will ensure that no household will need to pay for the repairs—including for how many households it expects it will need to intervene to ensure their homes are repaired at no cost to them—how it will speed up the process for resolving disputes involving guarantees, and how it will ensure bespoke arrangements are agreed and implemented swiftly for repairs where costs exceed £20,000; 6 • to confirm that it is now working with Companies House and The Insolvency Service to reduce the risk of incompetent and dishonest company directors closing and re-starting their businesses; and • to check that similar failings are not occurring in relation to other energy schemes. 3.1 The government agrees with the Committee’s recommendation. Recommendation implemented 3.2 The department provided responses to the Committee’s three requests by letter on 6 February 2026. 4. PAC conclusion: The Department’s senior officials took two years to recognise the scale of the problems, which led to many faulty installations that could have been avoided. This is unacceptable and demonstrates very poor overall supervision. 4. PAC recommendation: The Department should review its risk management and internal escalation systems so that issues identified within specific schemes are escalated swiftly and appropriately. This should apply equally to schemes funded through consumer levies as well as those directly funded by the taxpayer. 4.1 The government agrees with the Committee’s recommendation. Recommendation implemented 4.2 Risk management and associated escalation within DESNZ is managed through formal governance across projects, live schemes and portfolios. Each scheme has formal risk management in place with escalation of risks, as appropriate, to portfolio (Director General) level. While there are no further plans to introduce new levy schemes following the closure of ECO4 and GBIS, all new schemes will be subject to the same rigour of risk management processes. 4.3 As part of the risk management and escalation processes, officials have presented on four different occasions to the department’s Audit, Risk and Assurance (ARAC) Committee about risks associated with the rates of non-compliance identified in ECO4 and GBIS. 4.4 All schemes are subject to scrutiny from the internal Design Authority, and any spend is subject to agreed approval processes culminating in the Investment Committee for spend over £265 million CDEL or £50 million RDEL. The delegated authority limits are subject to revision by HM Treasury. In addition, government funded-capital schemes (WH: Local Grant and WH: Social Housing Decarbonisation Fund) are subject to external scrutiny from the National Infrastructure and Service Transformation Authority (NISTA) and the Treasury because they are set up as a Government Major Programme (GMPP). Risk is an integral part of providing assurance to all these review bodies. 4.5 In responding to the issues with ECO4 and GBIS the department is committed to reform of our consumer protection system and has set up both an internal programme board to track progress which includes Treasury and NISTA representation, as well as an external expert panel. The department is committed to external input and challenge. 4.6 To manage progress on the find-and-fix programme and remediation of all identified non-compliance, the department has set up a project board with robust risk management processes to manage the heightened risks. In addition, a senior civil servant now sits as an observer on the TrustMark board. 7 5. PAC conclusion: The Department’s system of quality assurance and consumer protection was far too complicated, and organisations within it focused too much on their own tasks rather than whether the system was protecting consumers. 5. PAC recommendation: The Department should publish an annual report to Parliament on all its retrofit schemes, their level of non-compliance and estimated fraud, and whether the schemes are working as intended. 5.1 The government agrees with the Committee’s recommendation. Target implementation date: Autumn 2027 5.2 The department will publish an annual report to Parliament on retrofit schemes, with the first publication before Autumn 2027. To align with the National Audit Office recommendation, this will be included in the department’s Annual Report and Accounts. The department’s Annual Report and Accounts sets out DESNZ’s approach to managing fraud and error, including counter-fraud governance and capability, risk management across major schemes. 5.3 The department has assessed the quality assurance processes in use across retrofit schemes to establish which quality metrics are currently being measured and how frequently. Based on the lessons learned from ECO4 and GBIS, the department intends to establish a standard methodology for measuring and reporting on error and fraud, which will be used for all new schemes. Where it is feasible and represents value for money to do so, the department will assess existing retrofit schemes against this methodology. 6. PAC conclusion: The Department did not give the risk of fraud appropriate priority, and it is likely that the known levels of fraud are a significant under- statement of the true level of fraud. 6a. PAC recommendation: Given the likely role of fraud in the poor-quality installations, the Department should refer the issue to the Serious Fraud Office to investigate the extent of fraud across ECO and bring criminals to justice. 6.1 The government disagrees with the Committee’s recommendation. 6.2 Ofgem, as scheme administrator for ECO4 and GBIS, has the responsibility for exploring cases of suspected fraud for the purpose of approving or rejecting measures submitted by energy suppliers. It can and does make referrals to relevant bodies including the Serious Fraud Office where appropriate. Therefore, this recommendation relates to an existing ongoing responsibility of the regulator. 6.3 The department is aware that, as part of the administration of ECO4 and GBIS, referrals have been made to the Serious Fraud Office. It would not be appropriate for the government to comment on this any further at this time. 6.4 The role of the Serious Fraud Office is to investigate and prosecute specific cases of serious or complex fraud, bribery or corruption. It is not a regulator, nor does it conduct market reviews. As a matter of policy, the Serious Fraud Office does not comment on referrals and it neither confirms nor denies investigations until doing so would not prejudice law enforcement activity. 6.5 The department, Ofgem and law enforcement partners such as the Serious Fraud Office will continue to engage and work closely together. 8 6.6 Cross-government data is now used operationally to improve prevention and detection of fraud. TrustMark has developed tools to make good use of its data to identify risk factors thereby highlighting potential issues earlier. 6b. PAC recommendation: HM Treasury should extend its requirement in Managing Public Money for a Fraud Risk Assessment on all new major areas of public spend to include levy-funded schemes instigated by the government, such as ECO. 6.7 The government agrees with the Committee’s recommendation. Target implementation date: Spring 2026 6.8 The source of funds (be it general taxation, dedicated levy or other income) is not a factor in determining whether public money should be subject to the rules set out in Managing Public Money. As such, the requirement for a Fraud Risk Assessment for new major areas of public spend already applies to levy-funded schemes instigated by central government bodies. Nevertheless, the government recognises the benefit in making this explicit. To avoid the need to wait for the next update of Managing Public Money, the Treasury Officer of Accounts will issue a Dear Accounting Officer letter to clarify this before Summer 2026. 6c. PAC recommendation: In future schemes, the Department should ensure that one body is responsible for fraud prevention and detection at the system level, enabled by counter-fraud activities of and data from other organisations in the system. 6.9 The government agrees with the Committee’s recommendation. Target implementation date: Summer 2028 6.10 The department notes the potential benefits with the suggestion of having one body responsible for fraud prevention and detection at the system level for government-run schemes. The Warm Homes Plan outlines the department’s commitment to reform the consumer protection system for government retrofit programmes. This system will be simpler with stronger government oversight. The department expects to consult on the details of these plans and therefore does not wish to prejudice that consultation. 6.11 The Warm Homes Agency is stated as having oversight of this future reformed consumer protection system, enabled by data-led insights and analysis. Data sharing and exchange between relevant bodies will be fundamental to verifying the details of all retrofit work, assuring that standards have been met, and detecting any possible fraud. By having data joined up across the system, fraud may be detected at any point, and potentially by a number of different bodies, and shared with the relevant body responsible for investigation or enforcement. 6.12 As set out in the Warm Homes Plan, the department’s strategy is to reduce fraud in government retrofit schemes throughout, from the initial scheme design through all aspects of operational delivery and oversight. It is not enough to rely on retrospective enforcement. The department will prioritise deterrence and prevention, before harm is done. The department also recognises the need for consumer protection for the wider market that does not necessarily benefit from government subsidy but is still contributing towards net zero and energy efficiency outcomes. When future schemes are designed, the department will incorporate lessons learned from ECO4 which include having clearly assigned owners for fraud risks and strong system oversight. 9 6d. PAC recommendation: HM Treasury should amend its guidance in Managing Public Money to recommend public bodies design fraud out of all new schemes as far as is sensible, and have one body responsible for fraud prevention and detection at the system level, enabled by counter-fraud activities of and data from other organisations in the system. 6.13 The government agree with the Committee’s recommendation. Target implementation date: Spring 2026 6.14 Managing Public Money (specifically paragraph A4.9.1) and the Professional standards and guidance for fraud risk assessment in government both already set out that Accounting Officers are responsible for managing public sector organisation’s risks, including fraud. 6.15 Where a central government department (including its arm’s length bodies) is the scheme owner (that is, sets policy intent, scheme design and is accountable to Ministers and Parliament), it owns the fraud risk assessment, even if some or all of the scheme is delivered through other bodies. As well as designing out fraud at the early stages of scheme design, the accountability and ownership of fraud risk assessment should be agreed at the outset and align to Managing Public Money. The Initial Fraud Impact Assessment (IFIA) should capture how many different organisations are involved in the spend activity, which should encourage departments to think about how fraud risk assessment is going to be managed when multiple bodies are involved. HM Treasury will issue updated guidance before summer 2026 to clarify and expand the existing principles on accountability and fraud risk management when multiple bodies are involved. 7. PAC conclusion: The serious failings to protect consumers on these schemes risk undermining confidence in all the Department’s retrofit schemes. 7a. PAC recommendation: The Department should give high priority to ensuring - and indeed should guarantee that within a reasonable period as defined by the Department and communicated to the Committee in the Treasury Minute response - all defective homes are remediated even after the current scheme has ended. 7.1 The government agrees with the Committee’s recommendation. Recommendation implemented 7.2 The government's approach to dealing with the non-compliance issues highlighted in the NAO and Committee’s reports is set out in response to recommendation 2 above; and high priority is being given to the find-and-fix programme. The department’s overall response of holding the system to account, set out in the letter to the Committee dated 6 February 2026 responding to recommendation 3, will continue after the ECO4 scheme has ended. 7b. PAC recommendation: The Department should reform its system of consumer protection in a way that rebuilds the public’s confidence in retrofits. This should address the issues highlighted by the ECO failures. 7.3 The government agrees with the Committee’s recommendation. Target implementation date: Summer 2028 7.4 The government intends to consult on the design of the future system during summer 2026. 10 7.5 The Warm Homes Plan (WHP) outlines the department’s commitment to reform the consumer protection system and lays out the three principles for the design of the future regime. These are: • Work should be right first time. Consumers must be able to trust that work will be done right the first time in all but the rarest circumstances. • Simplicity. People should not be expected to navigate a variety of organisations when they want to make changes to improve their homes. The installation process for low carbon heating and energy efficient home upgrades will be clear and straightforward. • Swift remediation and a straightforward process for redress. In those rare cases where things do go wrong, there must be clear lines of accountability, so that consumers are guaranteed to get any problems fixed quickly. 7.6 The department will simplify and streamline oversight and subject to consultation and Ministerial decision may give the Warm Homes Agency a central coordinating role, strengthening quality assurance, and improving early detection of poor practice rather than relying on redress after harm has occurred. 7.7 The Warm Homes Plan also lays out a plan for clearer national routes for advice, complaints and support, including a digital service and helpline, and places greater emphasis on protecting low-income and vulnerable households throughout their journey. Together, these reforms are intended to restore consumer confidence, prevent repeat failures seen under previous schemes. 7c. PAC recommendation: The Department should ensure that, in all future schemes, those tasked with checking the quality of design and installation are: • entirely independent from those doing the design and installation, 7.8 The government agrees with the Committee’s recommendation. Target implementation date: Summer 2027 7.9 The department endorses the need for independence between those conducting audits and the retrofit professionals involved in design and installation. The mechanisms for pursuing this independence are through revisions to the BSI owned PAS2035 and PAS2030 standards, the reform of government’s consumer protection system being led by DESNZ in collaboration with MHCLG and the design of any future government retrofit scheme. 7.10 The department is continuing to sponsor the British Standards Institution (BSI) to facilitate the amendment of PAS 2035 and PAS 2030, including how the PASs should address the need for retrofit professionals to carry out their role in a way free from a conflict of interest and determine the best outcome for the consumer by providing objectivity within all retrofit projects. Decisions on the PAS are taken by the PAS Steering Group and not by government. Previous updates to PAS guidelines have taken c.9-12 months to complete. 7d. PAC recommendation: The Department should ensure that, in all future schemes, those tasked with checking the quality of design and installation are: • …are accountable, 7.11 The government agrees with the Committee’s recommendation. Target implementation date: Summer 2028 11 7.12 The government has set out, in the Warm Homes Plan, plans for reform to the consumer protection, which includes oversight and compliance, and the intention is to consult on the design of the future system during summer 2026. 7e. PAC recommendation: The Department should ensure that, in all future schemes, those tasked with checking the quality of design and installation are: • and have the resources and competency to carry out this role. 7.13 The government agrees with the Committee’s recommendation Target implementation date: December 2026 7.14 Through the Warm Homes Plan, the government is approaching skills and workforce capacity and capability as a critical enabler of delivery, quality and consumer protection, and the department has explicitly recognised that recent scheme failures were driven in part by skills shortages, poor training and unstable pipelines of work. 7.15 In the Warm Homes Plan, the department committed to consider how competence under the PAS Retrofit Standards Framework could be broadened away from requiring specific qualifications to a more holistic assessment of skills, knowledge, experience and behaviour, in line with the approach set out under the Building Regulations. 7.16 To support this work, the department, working closely with the Retrofit Standards Task Group and the Building Safety Regulator’s Industry Competence Committee. These regulatory and industry experts will support development of competency frameworks, including new skills, knowledge, experience and behaviour statements, for named retrofit roles under the PAS Retrofit Standards Framework. In developing these new frameworks, the department aims to support greater clarity and understanding of the competencies required to carry out named roles, new training routes into the sector, and improved oversight arrangements. 7.17 The department is also committed to working with the Ministry for Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG) and the Building Safety Regulator (BSR) on their reviews of building professions and the competent person scheme conditions of authorisation as part of a reformed consumer protection system. 12 Sixty-third Report of Session 2024-26 Home Office Increasing police productivity Introduction from the Committee The role of the police is to maintain public safety and order, prevent crime and uphold the law. While the Home Office has overall responsibility for police forces, individual forces are operationally independent. The Home Office allocates the majority of police funding and maintains a system of local accountability, including intervening if chief constables or police and crime commissioners fail to carry out their duties. The government is implementing the ‘Safer Streets’ mission, aiming to halve knife crime and violence against women and girls over the next decade and increase public confidence in the police. To achieve this, it has introduced the Neighbourhood Policing Guarantee, which aims to increase the number of police officers, police community support officers and special constables working in neighbourhood policing roles by 13,000 by 2029. The government also intends to deliver a programme of police reform and plans to publish a white paper early in 2026. Policing received total funding of £19.9 billion in 2025–26. The government expects total police funding to increase by an average of 1.7% per year in real terms over 2025–26 to 2028–29. The Labour Party manifesto set out how the Neighbourhood Policing Guarantee would be paid for by tackling waste through a Police Efficiency and Collaboration Programme. Based on a report by the National Audit Office, the Committee took evidence on 24 November 2025 from the Home Office. The Committee published its report on 28 January 2026. This is the government’s response to the Committee’s report. Relevant reports • NAO report: Police productivity – Session 2024-26 (HC 1380) • PAC report: Increasing police productivity – Session 2024-26 (HC 1239) Government response to the Committee 1. PAC conclusion: The Home Office does not have sufficient data on the financial resilience or performance of police forces. 1. PAC recommendation: By July 2026, the Home Office should write to us setting out the key metrics it will use to measure the financial resilience, productivity and performance of police forces. In doing so, it should set out how it will support greater transparency and strengthen accountability by publishing data on the performance of police forces. 1.1 The government agrees with the Committee’s recommendation. Target implementation date: July 2026 1.2 The government has now published the first iteration of the Police Performance Framework, as part of wider reforms to the police performance system described in From Local to National: A New Model for Policing, the Police Reform White Paper. The Framework sets out key metrics of police force performance. Analysis and reporting against the 13 framework will enable better assessment of how a force is performing in its delivery of policing priorities. 1.3 The Home Office has committed to developing the Framework iteratively with a specific commitment to incorporate measures of force productivity and financial resilience in future iterations. The Home Office will write to the Committee by July 2026 setting out the key metrics it will incorporate in future iterations and our plans for public reporting of performance data to support greater transparency and strengthen accountability by publishing data on the performance of police forces. 1.4 The Home Office is currently working to improve and standardise the way in which financial information is provided by forces and developing a proposal to build on the Office for National Statistics’ forthcoming update on police productivity to provide a measure of force- level productivity. This work is being undertaken in collaboration with the policing sector and other external experts. 2. PAC conclusion: The Home Office does not understand how wider policy changes affect the demand on police resources. 2. PAC recommendation: In its Treasury Minute response, the Home Office should set out the arrangements it has established - across departments, local government and policing stakeholders - to identify and quantify the impact of policy changes affecting policing. 2.1 The government agrees with the Committee’s recommendation. Recommendation implemented 2.2 The Police Reform White Paper sets out a bold and ambitious reform programme to improve the quality, consistency and efficiency of policing. As part of those reforms the Home Office will work closely with policing to fully understand the impact of any policy changes that affect policing. 2.3 Under Consolidated Budgeting Guidance, departments already have a responsibility to consider the impacts of their policies on Local Authorities, including Police and Fire Authorities. Any quantifiable financial burden should then be funded for the duration of either the policy or the remaining Spending Review period whichever is the sooner. The Home Office also considers the impacts of its own policies on police resources and provides appropriate funding if assessed to be necessary. 2.4 The Home Office is working with policing to identify whether processes already in place to help manage burdens are sufficient, and we are aware of instances where provisions made are not working as intended. The Home Office is working with policing and relevant departments to understand what changes are required to help policing meet these costs. 2.5 The Home Office has been working closely with the Ministry of Justice, the police and other partners to consider the requirements across criminal justice reform, including in the context of the Police Reform White Paper. This covers the implementation of the Sentencing Act measures. 3. PAC conclusion: Police forces have limited flexibility to recruit people with the skills they need. 14 3. PAC recommendation: The Home Office should work with the National Police Chiefs’ Council to assess the implications of the existing focus on maintaining police officer numbers, including identifying the impact on personnel and the operational efficiency of forces. Within six months, the Home Office should write to the Committee with the results of this assessment, including the options to improve workforce flexibility and the potential benefits for policing. 3.1 The government agrees with the Committee’s recommendation. Recommendation implemented 3.2 The government has listened to policing’s concerns about the financial and operational impacts of requiring forces to maintain a centrally set number of officers; and have assessed that the Police Officer Maintenance Grant has become a barrier to visible policing, sometimes leading to warranted officers being placed in support functions. As a result, the officer maintenance grant and the requirement to achieve officer headcount targets has been abolished from 1 April 2026. 3.3 The 2026-27 police funding settlement provides forces with the investment needed to strengthen neighbourhood policing and modernise frontline capability. Overall funding for the policing system in England and Wales will be up to £21.0 billion, an increase of £1.3 billion compared to 2025-26. Of this, total funding to police forces will be up to £18.4 billion, an increase of up to £796 million. 3.4 As part of that settlement, the government is focused on what officers are doing rather than purely on officer numbers. For 2026-27, the Home Office is introducing a neighbourhood policing grant and has allocated £363 million of ringfenced funding to incentivise forces to grow neighbourhood policing teams towards the aim of 13,000 additional personnel in neighbourhood roles across England and Wales by the end of this Parliament. 3.5 The expectation is that forces will prioritise redeploying officers from roles where their warranted powers are not required, into neighbourhood policing teams in 2026-27. This moves away from setting total officer headcount targets. Prioritising neighbourhood policing may place some limitations on workforce flexibility which the Home Office will keep under review. 3.6 Ensuring that policing has the right people and skills to deliver an efficient modern service aligned to current and future demand is important as the Home Office moves forward with our police reforms. The Police Reform White Paper outlines proposals to improve leadership, professional development and create a new national workforce strategy which will support this aim. 4. PAC conclusion: The Home Office has not established how it will achieve the planned savings in its police efficiency and collaboration programme. 4a. PAC recommendation: In its Treasury Minute response, the Home Office should set out by when it expects to achieve its planned efficiency savings. In doing so, it should: • provide details on how it will achieve savings, including the areas in which it is seeking standardisation, which forces are using procurement frameworks, and the areas in which it is planning to mandate greater consistency across policing; 4.1 The government agrees with the Committee’s recommendation. Recommendation implemented 15 4.2 The Police Efficiency and Collaboration Programme (PECP) has an annual cashable efficiencies target of £354 million by 2028-29 and a non-cashable efficiencies target of saving thousands of officer hours to support government priorities such as neighbourhood policing. In addition to PECP, more recent government announcements in the Police Reform White Paper on AI and automation in policing are anticipated to drive additional productivity benefits. 4.3 PECP will achieve savings through four workstreams: commercial including cost recovery, productivity, data and the enabling services of the National Police Service. PECP uses the government’s collective buying power and leverages Crown Commercial Service frameworks. PECP is standardising and aggregating demand across the 43 police forces to achieve better value by buying once, buying well and buying better thus resolving the fragmented national capabilities landscape. It is funding the first national e-Commercial tool that will replace different systems (for example, contract management, pipeline management and e-tendering) and an unknown number of spreadsheets with one single commercial pipeline for policing. This, together with an increasing focus on national buying, will mean the police service becomes a better customer and will allow suppliers to reduce their whole lifecycle costs on policing services and contracts, driving better visibility and commercial relationships and delivering better value for all. 4.4 PECP is exploring what opportunities in Shared Services can be capitalised on to reduce administration burdens on forces, improve service provision and drive cost efficiencies. Although during the current spending review period (SR25) PECP expects modest gains from these areas as it will be establishing the foundations for Shared Services to enable efficiencies in future spending review periods. 4.5 The Home Office is planning greater consistency across policing in the following categories of spend: IT, fleet, and energy, The initial focus has been on energy (where 39 forces are now following the same national strategy with two more joining it this year), End User Devices (where PECP have held a pilot for centralised buying aggregating demand to a cross government standard with further aggregations this year), and fleet (where PECP have undertaken a first large scale aggregation event against common standards). Further categories of spend will be addressed in 2026-27 and beyond. 4.6 Mandating approaches to policing will be considered where there is a case to do so and where the use of Home Secretary powers is appropriate. 4b. PAC recommendation: In its Treasury Minute response, the Home Office should set out by when it expects to achieve its planned efficiency savings. In doing so, it should: • set out how it will ensure that claimed savings meet HM Treasury requirements. 4.7 The government agrees with the Committee’s recommendation. Recommendation implemented 4.8 PECP has an annual cashable efficiencies target of £354 million by 2028-29 and has a plan for achieving those savings through commercial efficiencies, greater cost recovery, productivity improvements, shared services, capabilities reform and establishing the enabling services of the National Police Service. The overall savings and efficiencies target agreed at the Spending Review 2025, which included PECP savings, was agreed by the Treasury and assured by the Office for Value for Money. The benefits and savings will be reported in line with programme’s Benefits Strategy which follows the Government Efficiency Framework. PECP has a strong project delivery function with efficient governance structures ensuring financial accountability and targets for its workstreams and operating model. 16 5. PAC conclusion: It is taking too long to identify and scale-up innovative practices and roll-out new technologies to improve police productivity. 5a. PAC recommendation: The Home Office should provide the Committee with an update in six months on the steps it has taken to speed up the adoption of new technologies and support police forces to improve their productivity. This should include setting out: • the digital technologies with the greatest potential and how it is supporting their wider adoption; • how it will support the College of Policing to identify innovations with the greatest potential; • how it will simplify the arrangements for approving and rolling-out new technologies; and • the results of using the new diagnostic tool to assess the scope for productivity improvements from streamlining police processes, including the potential benefits identified and plans for securing these. 5.1 The government agrees with the Committee’s recommendation. Target implementation date: July 2027 5.2 As set out in the Police Reform White Paper, the Home Office is already working to accelerate the adoption of new technologies to improve police productivity by increasing policing’s ability to identify what works, prioritise resource and roll out initiatives. 5.3 To achieve this, the Home Office is providing financial and practical support to the College of Policing and its Centre for Police Productivity to strengthen the identification and development of innovations with the greatest potential to improve productivity. This includes leading the assessment of innovations and best practice. Complementary activity funded through the Office of the Police Chief Scientific Adviser is strengthening the science and innovation pipeline and improving links between policing, academia and industry. 5.4 The Home Office is agreeing a set of productivity priorities focused on technologies with the greatest potential to reduce administrative burden. These include data and analytics, artificial intelligence to support decision‑making and investigations, and automation of routine processes. In its first year, the National Centre for AI in Policing will prioritise high‑impact use cases aligned to these priorities, supporting forces to adopt proven tools at pace while avoiding duplication of effort. 5.5 Working with partners, the Home Office is streamlining arrangements for identifying, assuring clearer routes to national adoption and preparation for transition to the National Police Service and scaling new technologies. These include significant investments made in new secure national infrastructure with the Law Enforcement Capability Network, the Law Enforcement Data Service, the Law Enforcement Cloud Platform and the Law Enforcement National Identity and Access Management service. These core services provide the foundations for future secure and scalable modern IT services. To ensure policing can increase adopting and exploitation of new technology a Business Change Centre of Excellence has been established to provide guidance and blueprints on improved use of capabilities such as facial recognition and advanced analytics, as well as supporting the readiness of forces for new transformational capabilities such as the Emergency Services Network. 5.6 The Home Office is also working with the College of Policing to assess outputs from the new productivity diagnostic tool to identify opportunities to streamline processes and support forces to realise benefits. 17 5b. PAC recommendation: In addition, the Home Office should: • require each police force to develop a business case, quantifying how much resource is required and over what period, to adequately update their IT systems; • work with the National Centre of Policing to develop a roadmap for upgrading the IT infrastructure across and within all police forces to enable interoperability, improve their resilience and ability to collaborate more effectively; • identify and prioritise key legacy systems and provide the resources to enable them to be upgraded and consolidated across police forces; • provide dedicated resources, based on the above work, to enable the upgrade of IT infrastructure and systems across and within all police forces according to the roadmap. 5.7 The government agrees with the Committee’s recommendation. Target implementation date: December 2029 5.8 The Home Office is already working closely with policing to modernise IT systems, implement a new IT strategy and ahead of the National Police Service being stood up by the Home Office scoping an Enterprise Architecture function for policing. Once established, the National Police Service is expected to set strategic direction to ensure consistent, interoperable IT systems and will consider these recommendations further then. 5.9 The Home Office is already addressing concerns through work on national data standards, a new National Data Integration and Exploitation Service, and more than 30 national programmes are upgrading or replacing legacy technology, with stronger cyber resilience and alignment to zero‑trust security. The national programmes allow for data to be shared between forces without having to replace local IT. 5.10 This transformation is centred on the Law Enforcement Data Service (LEDS), built to replace the Police National Computer, and increasing the number of national and local services hosted on police assured cloud platforms. Officers will have faster access to information. It has Application Programming Interfaces (APIs), allowing national and force systems to interoperate without bespoke local integrations. LEDS is providing funding to local forces to allow them to onboard. 5.11 The Home Office is modernising other systems, including the National Strategic ANPR Platform, Police National Database, and Child Abuse Image Database, replacing ageing infrastructure and improving resilience. Productivity‑enabling systems, including Robotic Process Automation, Digital Public Contact, Digital Case File, and automated audio‑visual redaction, are being scaled nationally, freeing up officer time and standardising proven approaches. 5.12 Any further updates to force level IT systems must align with the implementation of the Police Reform White Paper in particular the commitment to force mergers, planning for which will be underpinned by the forthcoming Independent Review into Police Force Structures. The Home Office will consider the recommendations further as part of implementation of force mergers. 6. PAC conclusion: The outdated and piecemeal approach to funding police forces is frustrating efforts to secure long-term productivity improvements. 18 6a. PAC recommendation: After the publication of the White Paper on police reforms, the Home Office should write to the Committee setting out how the new accountability arrangements will support it in leading the policing system to improve its productivity and deliver government’s policy commitments. In doing so, it should: • set out in detail the new governance arrangements that will replace police and crime commissioners in those areas where there is no regional mayor; and … 6.1 The government agrees with the Committee’s recommendation. Recommendation implemented 6.2 On 26 January 2026, the government published the Police Reform White Paper, setting out an ambitious programme to improve the quality, consistency and efficiency of policing. The reforms aim to reduce duplication and deliver £354 million in efficiency savings, supported by a new performance system and a modernised police workforce equipped to tackle modern crime using improved technology. The Police Reform White Paper proposes a new policing model comprising of a National Police Service for cross‑border crime, strengthened regional forces for specialist investigations, and locally focused policing for community crime. A new Police Performance Framework will provide a consistent national picture of crime and policing activity across England and Wales. 6.3 The Police Reform White Paper sets out plans to abolish the Police and Crime Commissioner model at the end of their current term in May 2028. At this point, policing functions will transfer to Strategic Authority Mayors where possible, or to elected council leaders through new Policing and Crime Boards, which will be scalable to future force structures. Subject to Parliamentary time, the government intends to legislate through a Police Reform Bill to bring about these changes. The Home Office is working with partners to design a stronger governance system, with Boards appointing a Policing and Crime Lead and assuming responsibility for holding Chief Constables to account, setting priorities, agreeing the precept, and ensuring robust financial oversight. Tailored arrangements are being designed for Wales. 6b. PAC recommendation: After the publication of the White Paper on police reforms, the Home Office should write to the Committee setting out how the new accountability arrangements will support it in leading the policing system to improve its productivity and deliver government’s policy commitments. In doing so, it should: • … explain how it will revise existing funding arrangements to provide police forces with an equitable and stable basis from which to manage their finances. 6.4 The government agrees with the Committee’s recommendation. Recommendation implemented 6.5 Changes to police governance, force mergers and the creation of the National Police Service require a new way of allocating funding between forces, aligned with these new structures. The Police Reform White Paper confirmed that the Home Office will review the police funding formula once the implementation of police reform is underway so that the new formula reflects the new police force structures. The Home Office will launch an independent review into police force structures to consider the right model for local policing, which will report in the summer. The scope of any review of the funding formula will need to reflect the outcome of this independent process. 6.6 The Home Office wrote to the Committee on the 4 March with further details. 19 Sixty-fourth Report of Session 2024-26 Department of Health and Social Care Costs of clinical negligence Introduction from the Committee Clinical negligence is a breach of a legal duty of care which directly caused harm to the patient. If clinical negligence has occurred, a patient or their representative may claim for damages against the clinicians or their employers. NHS services are legally liable for any clinical negligence and must pay compensation to the claimant and cover their legal fees if the claim is proven. This report only considers the cost of clinical negligence in England. NHS Resolution is responsible for administering seven clinical negligence indemnity schemes for general practice and secondary healthcare services in England. Members of NHS Resolution’s indemnity schemes include NHS trusts, foundation trusts and general practitioners. Private contractors, such as dental practitioners, are generally legally liable for their own clinical negligence claims. The Department oversees NHS Resolution and develops policy to manage the costs of clinical negligence cases. Based on a report by the National Audit Office, the Committee took evidence on Thursday 20 November 2025 from the Department of Health and Social Care and NHS England. The Committee published its report on Friday 30 January 2026. This is the government’s response to the Committee’s report. Relevant reports • PAC report: Handling Clinical Negligence Claims in England (2002) • PAC report: Managing the costs of clinical negligence in hospital trusts – Session 2017-19 (HC 397) • PAC report: DHSC 2022–23 Annual Report and Accounts – Session 2023-24 (HC 459) • PAC report: DHSC 2023 -24 Annual Report and Accounts – Session 2024-26 (HC 639) • NAO report: Costs of clinical negligence – Session 2024-26 (HC 1335) • PAC report: Costs of clinical negligence – Session 2024-26 (HC 1234) Government response to the Committee 1. PAC conclusion: The Department has failed to tackle the rising costs of clinical negligence despite repeated warnings. 1a. PAC recommendation: Alongside its Treasury Minute response to this report the Department should write to the Committee explain its operational plan to tackle clinical negligence, including key milestones for achieving reductions in claim costs and volumes. 1.1 The government agrees with the Committee’s recommendation. Target implementation date: Autumn 2026 1.2 The rising cost of clinical negligence and experience of patients navigating the system are of great concern to government and ministers are committed to addressing this issue and to improving the experience of NHS patients who have been injured by negligent NHS care. Between 2006-07 and 2024-25, total payments for clinical negligence increased five-fold from approximately £0.6 billion to £3.1 billion (nominal) and are forecast to continue rising, putting further pressure on NHS finances. The government does not accept that ever increasing 20 levels of compensation is in the wider public interest and agrees that this issue should be tackled. 1.3 The government will write to the Committee by this Autumn to set out the case for change, and its workplan including to describe key milestones, and the likely areas of focus for reform. There is no one “quick fix” but instead a series of complex issues which together bring an upward cost pressure on clinical negligence budgets. The department is urgently examining how to best act swiftly to address some of the problems. 1.4 As the Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC) described in the Committee hearing in November, David Lock KC has been providing expert advice on addressing the rising costs and how to improve patients’ experience of clinical negligence claims. 1b. PAC recommendation: The Department should also publish David Lock KC’s review of clinical negligence within six months of it being completed. This should include all supporting analysis and the Department's response to any recommendations made by the review. 1.5 The government disagrees with the Committee’s recommendation. 1.6 The government has no current plans to publish a separate report of David Lock KC’s work. 1.7 David Lock KC has been providing ongoing expert advice to Ministers and is working with officials in DHSC to develop policy proposals. This process has allowed the government to utilise David Lock KC’s depth of knowledge and experience in both the clinical negligence system and government policy. The department’s view is that ongoing expert advice to support its policymaking remains the right approach to achieving the best possible policy outcomes. 2. PAC conclusion: The NHS has not done enough to tackle the underlying causes of harm to patients. 2a. PAC recommendation: The Department must set a national framework for improving patient safety with clear targets for annual improvement. 2.1 The government agrees with the Committee’s recommendation. Recommendation implemented 2.2 The government is committed to improving patient safety across the NHS and tackling the underlying causes of harm to patients, and has implemented a national framework, detailed below. 2.3 The NHS Patient Safety Strategy (2019) sets a national framework for the NHS to improve patient safety continuously. The Strategy is clear that while it is not possible to set a single annual target for safety, it has demonstrated that identifying priority areas and focussing on effective improvement programmes can improve safety and reduce harm. 2.4 The Strategy has been in operation for over six years. NHS England estimate that it is now achieving the impact it estimated in 2019; saving around 1,000 lives and £100 million annually. Significant achievements across the Strategy’s national patient safety programmes include over 1500 neonatal lives saved, over 500 cerebral palsy cases in premature babies avoided, more than 1900 deaths prevented through medicines safety improvements and over 1700 potentially lifesaving interventions made following Martha’s Rule calls. 21 2.5 However, the government accepts there is much more to do, particularly in the current context of system pressures and demographic change. This means the ability to apply evidence-based, just and effective patient safety principles, as part of a wider approach to quality, is more important than ever. 2.6 The development of a Quality Strategy and a revitalised National Quality Board are key components of the government’s 10 Year Health Plan. Once the Quality Strategy is published work will begin to develop a new, updated NHS Patient Safety Strategy later in 2026 to continue the focus on improving patient safety. 2b. PAC recommendation: The Department must review the NHS complaints system and improve the number of cases that are resolved without recourse to litigation. 2.7 The government agrees with the Committee’s recommendation. Target implementation date: Summer 2028 2.8 The government wants the NHS to resolve concerns as early as possible, reducing the need for patients to pursue further action and ensuring the NHS learns from feedback and improves. DHSC notes the Committee’s findings that the complaints system is confusing and unresponsive – reflecting what was heard during engagement for the 10 Year Health Plan, where patients and carers expressed confusion about where and how to complain and described their struggle to get responses to their concerns. 2.9 The 10 Year Health Plan emphasises the importance of a stronger patient voice, greater transparency, and a culture of learning from concerns. It sets out a commitment to improve how the NHS listens to and acts on patients’ and carers’ voices and experiences. In Chapter 6 of the 10 Year Health Plan, the government commits to significantly improve the complaints process within all NHS commissioner and provider organisations; and to set clear standards for both the timeliness and the quality of responses to complaints. The department will update complaints regulations and increase the use of AI tools to ensure complaints data is collected and responded to far more quickly. 2.10 The 10 Year Health Plan also commits to bringing patient voice in-house by abolishing Healthwatch England (subject to Parliamentary approval) and establishing a new Patient Experience Directorate within DHSC during 2026-27. This new Directorate, once introduced, will take responsibility for significantly improving the NHS complaint’s function and delivery of complaints reform by summer 2028. 2c. PAC recommendation: The Department should estimate and track the costs to the NHS of treating avoidable harm. 2.11 The government disagrees with the Committee’s recommendation 2.12 The wider question around the health economics of patient safety will be explored as part of the forthcoming update to the NHS Patient Safety Strategy by working with academics and health economists to better understand how to cost patient safety. 2.13 The department does not believe a system to track the costs to the NHS of treating avoidable harm would be financially or logistically feasible. Calculating costs of treating ‘avoidable’ harm would be very complex. There is no single, cost-effective mechanism for identifying ‘avoidable’ harm in healthcare. A methodology to calculate could be based on ‘events prevented x average Healthcare Resource Group tariff price for the relevant admission type’, however this does not represent the full economic or opportunity cost of care and estimation of ‘events prevented’ would be very challenging. Further, calculating this for all types of harm across the NHS would require significant investment in clinical review capacity, financial analytics and back-office support in NHS organisations to calculate costs associated 22 with incidents. This does not align with the government’s 10 Year Health Plan and ongoing approach to workforce. However, the department can demonstrate costs